

CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.

COUNTRY Germany (Russian Zone)

DATE DISTR. 31 MAY 51

SUBJECT Hauptverwaltung für Ausbildung:
Progress of Training

NO. OF PAGES

2

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ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCL.
(LISTED BELOW)

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255

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INFO.

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

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1. The ideological level attained by NVA personnel has risen considerably over last year, mainly thanks to the noticeable improvement in the work of the Party and FDJ organizations, which have rendered invaluable support to the unit commanders in the discharge of their military and political tasks. Also the unit commanders and Polit/Kultur section heads have noticeably improved their performance in guiding the units entrusted to their responsibility in political and Party activities. All this points to the leading role played by members and candidates of the SED and of FDJ members. There has also been a perceptible tightening of order and discipline in the basic units. Objekte headed by the following officials are singled out for praise because there have been no instances of AWOL or desertions: Inspekteur Herrmann, Kommandeur Rost, Kommandeur Fischer, Kommandeur Bernhard, Kommandeur Menn, Kommandeur Guenther, Kommandeur Schmidt, Kommandeur Krumm, Inspekteur Welz, Kommandeur Buschmann, Kommandeur Bisewski, Kommandeur Raubach, Kommandeur Falbaum and Kommandeur Helbig. They are furthermore commended for doing a superior job in organizing and executing military and political training.
2. Despite the many favorable aspects, a number of serious inadequacies in the work performed by unit commanders and Polit/Kultur section chiefs, also in Party and FDJ organizations, have been observed during the first training phase. Special exception is taken to delays in the preparation of training schedules, and improper reporting on training progress. The following unit commanders are criticized for not having seen to it that company training schedules list the subjects taught, training objectives, and the locations where exercises were to be held: Kommandeur Gotthilf, Inspekteur Smolorz, Inspekteur Wagner, Kommandeur Neubert. Political training must also be criticized. Polit/Kultur sections are to be blamed for failure to supervise political training, for winking at cases of instructors found insufficiently prepared for their lectures and for not insisting on a 100% attendance at political training. This state of affairs is the reason for a considerable number of trainees having only a superficial knowledge of the histories of the CPSU (B) and of the German people. An especially grave offense is the widely prevailing practice of Polit/Kultur personnel, both on company and on section level, excusing themselves from the conducting of political training and turning this task over to platoon leaders altogether unfit for the task.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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Class. Changed To: <i>s (c)</i>
Auth.: <i>HR 10-2</i> 8 AUG 1978
Date: <i>8 Aug 1978</i>

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In a number of schools Polit/Kultur seminars are poorly organized and found to be at a low ideological level. The following shortcomings are specifically noted: the bypassing of salient issues, the failure to establish rapport between the subject discussed and real life in the units, and lack of graphic training aids.

3. As far as tactical training is concerned, although training has been given on squad level, there are still a number of deficiencies noted in the individual training; e.g., digging in improperly done, no exploitation of terrain in the advance, reconnaissance and taking up firing positions at night performed very poorly, etc. Military courtesy is not adequately enforced by some officers, the following being particularly blameworthy: Kommandeur Gotthilf, Inspekteur Herrmann, Inspekteur Smolorz, Inspekteur Wagner, Inspekteur Neubert.
4. Weapons training has not measured up to requirements with resultant accidents on guard duty. In this connection the following officers are to be censured: Inspekteur Vogel, Kommandeur Bleck, Kommandeur Guenther. More use should have been made of training aids when teaching firing positions, target practice, and actual firing. In the estimation of range, the trainees evinced no great skill.
5. Officers' training has been found to be on a particularly low level. In particular, training demonstrations are not properly organized and sometimes are carried out without sufficient preparation. Instead of conducting exercises on sand tables or in the open field, a preference is shown for class rooms. There are no individual assignments given, and the officers themselves display little zeal in the improvement of their military capabilities. Staff officers have not been formed into separate groups for purposes of special exercises and staff work training. Training classes, especially those attended by platoon leaders, are too large, in some instances being composed of as many as 50 officers. In several units young platoon leaders neither know how to conduct training exercises nor are able to assert their leadership in the command of subordinate units. Conditions like these are observed in units under the command of Inspektore Herrmann and Smolorz. As result of farming out classes for work projects, absenteeism during training periods is particularly high (30 - 40%). Whereas the number of disciplinary violations has gone down, there has been an increase of desertions, suicides, etc., among officers. The following unit commanders are held to blame: Inspekteur Wagner (5 cases), Kommandeur Kiep (2 cases), Inspekteur Vogel (2 cases). Contributing causes are: a) shortcomings in Party and other collective activities and b) failure to organize sports on a sufficiently broad basis. Officers particularly should be made to engage in collective sport, rather than be left to their own desires during off-duty hours.

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